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Abstract: Recently group-oriented applications over unsecure open networks such as Internet or wireless networks
have become very popular. Thus, group communication security over unsecure open networks has become a vital
concern. Group key establishment (GKE) protocols are used to satisfy the condentiality requirement of a newly started
communication session by the generation or sharing of an ephemeral common key between the group members. In this
study, we analyze the computation and communication eciency of GKE protocols. Besides condentiality, the security
characteristics of identication and integrity control are also required for all steps of the protocol implementations. Thus,
the main contribution of this work is to provide the computation and communication eciency analysis of the same GKE
protocols along with the identication of the group entities and integrity control of messages during the protocol steps.
The specic implementation and analysis of GKE protocols are performed by group key agreement (GKA) with pairing-
based cryptography and group key distribution (GKD) with veriable secret sharing, respectively. Finally, a comparison
of GKA and GKD protocols on the basis of their strong points and cost characteristics are also provided to inform
potential users.
Key words: Group key establishment, secure communication, pairing-based cryptography, veriable secret sharing.
1. Introduction to group key establishment protocols
The establishment of a common secret key between the members of a group over an open unsecure network is
vital to satisfy secure communication requirements. The condentiality of the communication between members
of a group requires sharing a common ephemeral key to use in the encryption and decryption of communication
data. For this purpose, there are two group key establishment (GKE) protocols: group key agreement (GKA),
a protocol whereby the parties jointly establish a common secret, and group key distribution (GKD), a protocol
whereby one of the parties creates or obtains a secret value and then securely distributes it to other parties.
The rst security drawback of both methods is the lack of authentication. For this reason, an active
adversary can compromise the communication of legitimate parties by the use of a \man in the middle attack".
The second security drawback is the lack of condentiality and integrity checking during the protocol execution.
Authentication is generally based on long-term keys, which can be associated with identities. There are
two main approaches to provide authentication: public key infrastructure (PKI) and identity based (ID-based)
infrastructure. However, ID-based cryptography has two important disadvantages. First, it suers from the key
escrow problem since the private key generator generates private keys of entities using its master secret key.
Second, it requires a secure channel to distribute generated private keys to participants. In this study:
Correspondence: serapsahin@iyte.edu.tr
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(i) The GKA original protocol model is based on Lin et al.'s multiparty key agreement protocol [1]. Our
contribution is the usage of a digital signature in order to provide message integrity checking and authen-
tication between the users with a PKI solution.
(ii) The GKD original protocol model is based on Feldman's veriable secret sharing (VSS) key distribution
protocol [2,3]. Due to nature of the VSS protocol, there is a secure channel requirement. We propose
the usage of PKI, encryption, and signature schemes, which are realized in the execution of protocol over
unsecure public networks.
In this article, we analyze and compare the communication and computation costs of these two GKE
protocol models with and without our contribution (i.e. authentication and integrity checking).
Section 2 presents the notations and specications of the implemented protocols. In Section 3, the
construction of GKA and GKD protocols is examined with their implementation results and security and
eciency analyses with and without our contributions. Finally, Section 4 presents the results of the eciency
analysis and implementation of the GKE protocols.
2. Notations, assumptions, and specications of implemented protocol models
2.1. Notations used in the implementation of protocol models
The common notations of both protocol implementations are:
 n is the number of participants in the group.
 Ui is a participant of group, Ui 2 fU1; U2; : : : ; Un , i = 1; ::; n .
 Certi = fIDi; Yi is the certicate of Ui and its long-term public key is Yi , and the unique numeric
identier is IDi; . Certi is signed by the certication authority (CA).
 H is an SHA-512 secure hash function.
The specic notations of key agreement protocol are:
 A bilinear map e : Gp  Gp ! GT between the two groups Gp and GT as long as a variant of the
computational Die{Hellman assumption is hard on Gp .
 p is the prime number.
 P is the generator of additive group Gp .
 K is the common secret key.
 ai is the long-term private key randomly chosen by Ui .
 Yi is the long-term public key computed Yi = aiP by the related party Ui .
 xi is the short-term (ephemeral) secret key randomly chosen by Ui .
 Ti and Xi are public messages.
 Public parameters are param = hGp; GT ; e; p; P; Hi .
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The specic notations of key distribution protocol are:
 Primes qand psuch that q j (p  1), and a generator g 2 Zp is an element of order q .
 s is common secret that will be shared.
 si 2 f s1; s2; : : :; sn g represent subsecrets.
 L is a leader who shares the common secret s among the n participants.
 xi is Ui 's long-term secret key of corresponding public key Yi .
 t is the threshold value, according to Shamir's (t; n)secret sharing scheme.
 f(x) = a0 + a1x + a2x2 + : : : + atxt  1; is a (t   1) degree polynomial in which secret s = a0 and
[ a0; : : : ; at ] 2 Zq .
 C is the commitment vector including dierent t DLog commitments;
Ci = g
ai ; i = 0; ::; t :
 ( sig1sig2 ) is signature pair and
 
Enc1i ; Enc
2
i

is an ElGamal encryption pair.
 Public parameters are param = hq; p; g; Hi .
2.2. Assumptions used in the implementation of protocols
 Before the protocol starts, every party Ui generates his/her Certi = f IDi; Yi g from a CA and these
certicates of users have already been exchanged between group participants.
 The protocol works over an open unsecure channel forming a secure, closed communication group of
participants. The members of the group are called reliable; they do not leak secret information outside of
the group, and they send the correct messages dened by the protocol. All participants agree to follow
the protocol.
2.3. Specications of the implemented protocols
For key agreement protocol:
 The protocol models use the broadcast communication model.
 For each run of the protocol, there is one among n parties, which works as a leader L and starts the
protocol specifying the static group number.
For key distribution protocol:
 The protocol needs two constant rounds, namely sharing and reconstruction, with n parties who partic-
ipate in the establishment of the common secret and a leader L who shares the common secret s and
commitments C among the n participants.
 There is a threshold value, which means that more than t shared subsecret values can be used to
reconstruct the common secret generated by the leader. The relation between the threshold t and n
is  ( 2t+ 1 ) [4,5].
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3. Implementation of GKA and GKD protocols
A more detailed documentation and numeric examples of these implementations were presented in [6].
3.1. The common implementation environment
Both algorithms are implemented for a small group of users as Ui; i = 1; ::; 4. ANSI C is preferred as the
programming language and the GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic (GMP) Library (http://gmplib.org/) is
chosen for multiple precision calculations, while the OpenSSL Library
(http://www.openssl.org/) is used for SHA-512 (http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/ps). The Pairing-Based
Cryptography (PBC) Library (http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/) is used for the pairing map and elliptic curve
calculations are used for the key agreement protocol. The conguration of the machine is an Intel Core 2 Duo
2.0 GHz CPU, 4 GB RAM, and Ubuntu 12.10 operating system.
3.2. Security contributions to the GKA protocol
In this study, the communication among reliable participants satises the condentiality via pairing-based
cryptography and identication, integrity, and nonrepudiation via the Boneh{Lynn{Shacham (BLS) short
signature scheme [7,8].
3.3. Security contributions to the GKD protocol
The protocol is transformed into a feasible form to apply over an open-unsecure channel by adding encryption
and signature algorithms. In this study, the communication between reliable participants satises the conden-
tiality via cryptographic structures such as the ElGamal encryption algorithm and satises the identication,
integrity, and nonrepudiation via the ElGamal signature scheme [9]. To improve the security level of the im-
plementation, ElGamal encryption and signature schemes can be implemented by dierent group structures or
schemes as indicated in [10,11].
3.4. Implementation and eciency analysis of GKA protocol
Setup: This is an oine task and numeric values of input and setup parameters are calculated by use of the
PBC Library. E is a super singular curve dened by y2 = x3+x over Fq and P 2 E=Fq is a 1024-bit generator.
The Weil pairing on the curve E =Fq2 is a mapping: Gq  Gq ! GT . The q = p  h + 1 is 512-bit prime
number where h is a multiple of 12 and p is 160-bit prime number. Each Ui should have static public Yi as a
1024-bit and private ai as a 160-bit key pair where Yi=aiP .
Now the protocol can be started by leader L . Here the process of the protocol is given in two sections
as \GKA - protocol steps" and \GKA - protocol steps with contributions" as depicted in Figures 1 and 2,
respectively.
3.4.1. GKA protocol steps as depicted in Figure 1
The leader L from set U announces the public parameters param = hGp; GT ; e; p; P; Hi and the group
number n . Then the rst round starts.
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#1   Each user calculates  and sends 
to all users 
#2  Each user does pairing opera on to 
generate and broadcasts the message  
#3  Each user calculates the common 
key   
 
 
 
 
−  
Figure 1. GKA - protocol steps.
#1   Each user calculates and  signs   and sends 
( )  to all users and verifies all received 
( )  
#2 Each user does pairing opera on to generate, 
sign and broadcast the message ( )and verify 
all received ( )  
#3 Each user calculates the common key   
 
 
 
 
−  
Figure 2. GKA - protocol steps with contributions.
Round 1 - Step 1: Each user Ui; i = 1; : : :; n , chooses a random ephemeral secret number xi ,
computes Ti = xiYi = xi(aiP ), and sends Ti to all users.
Round 2 - Step 2: Each user does pairing operation to generate and broadcast the message
Xi=e ((Yi+1+Ti+1) ; (Yi+2+T i+2)  (Yi 1+T i 1))(ai+ aixi) .
Round 2 - Step 3: Each user calculates the common key:
Ki=e ((Yi+1 + Ti+1) ; n  (Yi 1 + Ti 1))ai + aixi  Xn 1i Xn 2i+1  : : : Xi 2 =
e (P; P )

(an + anxn)  (a1 + a1x1)  (a2 + a2x2) + (a1 + a1x1)  (a2 + a2x2)  (a3 + a3x3) + : : :
+ (an 1 + an 1xn 1)  (an + anxn)  (an+1 + an+1xn+1)

:
Furthermore, the common shared secret key is then obtained by the key derivation function algorithm-kdf ,
which is simultaneously used to calculate the common secret by each Ui (http://www.emc.com/emc-plus/rsa-
labs/standards-initiatives/pkcs-5-password-based-cryptography-standard.html).
K = kdf( Ki k U1 k U2 k U3 k U4 ) :
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3.4.2. GKA protocol steps with contributions as depicted in Figure 2
Round 1 - Step 1: Each user calculates and signs Ti and sends Sigi(Ti) to all users for identication and
integrity checking, and at the same time veries all received Sigi(Ti). In implementation, each user generates
a digest value of Ti by Hi = SHA  512(T i). Then Ui signs the Hi value with his static private key ai by
using the BLS short signature scheme. Here the BLS output is a point on E =Fq with 1024-bit length.
Each user Ui also veries received Sigi (Ti) by calculating Hi and checking that e(Sigi (Ti); P ) =
e(Hi Yi ): If the result of the function is equal, then Sigi (Ti) is veried.
Round 2 - Step 2: Each user does pairing operation to generate, sign, and broadcast the message
Sigi(Xi) and verify all received Sigi(Xi) by these calculations: Hi = SHA 512(Xi) and Sigi(Xi) = aiHi .
The verication of the received Ui 's signatures and integrity checking of Xi are satised by calculation
of Hi = SHA  512(Xi)and checking the equality of e (Sigi (Xi) ; P ) = e(Hi Yi ).
Round 2 - Step 3: Each user simultaneously calculates the common key K as described in Step 3 of
Section 3.4.1. This step does not require any security contribution.
3.4.3. Observations and eciency analysis of GKA
In light of both implementation results of the protocol, the total eciency costs in terms of computation,
communication, and round complexities including the whole parties during Round 1 and Round 2 are available
in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively.
Table 1. Implementation results of GKA-based steps.
GKA - protocol steps Computational cost (ms) Communication cost (bits)
Round 1 - Step 1 4 ( 1 ) n 1024
Round 2 - Step 2 3 ( 1 ) n 1024
Round 2 - Step 3 6 ( 1 ) -
Total cost of protocol 13 ( 1 ) n 2048! (n )
Table 2. Implementation results of GKA protocol with contributions.
GKA - protocol steps
Computational cost (ms) Communication cost (bits)
with contributions
Round 1 - Step 1 28 ( 1 ) n 2048
Round 2 - Step 2 13 + 5(n  1) (n ) n 2048
Round 2 - Step 3 6 ( 1 ) {
Total cost of protocol (42 + 5n) (n ) n 4096! (n )
 As seen from these results (Tables 1 and 2), only the computational cost is aected by security contributions
and its computational complexity increases from a constant to a linear class. On the other hand, the
communication cost grows twice but it already belongs to the same linear complexity class due to the
used signature scheme. Dierent signature schemes can add dierent space costs.
3.5. Implementation and eciency analysis of GKD protocol - VSS
Setup: This is an oine task of the protocol. The numeric values of input and setup parameters are calculated
by using the GMP Library. The p is a 1024-bit prime number and g is a 1024-bit primitive root of Zp . The q
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is a 512-bit prime number, where q j (p 1). For each user Ui and leader we have a (1024-bit) static private key
xi2Zp , and (1024-bit) static public key Yi where Yi = gxi (mod p) and Certi = (Yi , IDi), which is exchanged
before the protocol starts.
Now the protocol can be started by one of the group participants, called leader L . Here the process of
the protocol is presented in two sections as \GKD - protocol steps" (Figure 3) and \GKD - protocol steps with
contributions" (Figure 4).
Leader 
 
 
 
−  
#1 The Leader generates ,  and  
then sends   and   to each  
#2 Each   verifies received  with 
received  and send own verified  to
all other users except Leader. 
#3  Verifica!on of subsecrets  that
are received from other users is done by 
using . 
#4 Each  calculates common  key    by 
Lagrange Interpola!on 
Figure 3. GKD - protocol steps.
#1 The Leader generates ,  and  then 
signed  and encrypted   and sends them to 
each   
#2 Each    does signature  verifica on  of , 
decryp on  of  and then verifica on of  with 
. Then  sends own verified and 
  to all other users . 
#3  Each  decrypts received  values and verifies 
received  with .  
Leader 
#4 Each   calculates  common  key    by 
Lagrange Interpola on. 
 
 
 
 
−  
Figure 4. GKD - protocol steps with contributions.
3.5.1. GKD protocol steps as presented in Figure 3
Round 1 - Sharing phase
Leader L announces the public parameters hiparam = q; p; g; H and the group number n . Here
n = 4 and t = d (n  1) / 2 e = 2, which denes the second-degree polynomial f (x) = a0 + a1x + a2x2 (mod q) :
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In this polynomial, a0 , a1 , a2 2 Zq are randomly selected constants of polynomial, and a0 would like to be
shared among the four participants as common secret key s . The commitment vector C is based on DLog
commitments [4] as C = (C0 = g
a0 ; C1 = g
a1 ; C2 = g
a2 ) (mod p).
Step 1: L generates f(x), C , and su-secrets si for each user Ui , using IDi ; si = f(IDi) (mod q):The
leader sends C and si to each Ui .
Round 2 - Reconstruction phase
Step 2: Each Ui does verication of subsecret si by using received commitment vector C . If si is
veried properly, it is sent to all other (n  2) users by Ui .
Step 3: The verication of subsecrets si that are received from the other (n  2) users is done by using
C:This step has to be done by (n 1) users for (n 2) times, and hence the computational complexity is O(n2)
in this step of the protocol.
gsi (mod p) =
tQ
j=0
Ci
j
j (mod p) where i; ( i = 1; : :; n ) are indices of the participant and j; ( j = 0; : : :; t )
are indices of polynomial coecients.
Step 4: Lagrange interpolation and common secret key establishment :
Each party Ui has to construct polynomial f(x) from any ( t + 1 ) veried subsecrets si , which are
collected in set Wi and then used in the following Lagrange interpolation formula:
Li (0) = 
w
i =
t+1Q
Ui; Uj 2W; j 6= i
IDj
IDj   IDi and then:
f (0) =
t+1P
Ui 2W
Li(0)si (note that s = a0 = f(0)) gives the common secret key.
This step is realized (n  1) (t+ 1) times, and then the complexity is here (n2). The lower bound also
is equal to 
(n2) due to t = d (n  1) / 2 e , so the complexity value   n2 is used in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3. Implementation results of GKD-based steps.
GKD - protocol steps Computational cost (ms) Communication cost (bits)
Round 1 - Step 1 6 ( 1 ) n  1024 + 512
Round 2-Steps 2 1 ( 1 ) -
Round 2 - Step 3 2 (n2 ) n2  512
Round 2-Step 4 0.04 (n2 ) -
Total cost of protocol 9 (n2 ) (n2)
Table 4. Implementation results of GKD protocol with contributions.
GKD - protocol steps
Computational cost (ms) Communication cost (bits)
with contributions
Round 1 - Step 1 18 ( 1 ) (n 512) + (t 1024)
Round 2-Steps 2 14 ( 1 ) n2  512
Round 2 - Step 3 6 (n2 ) n2  2048
Round 2-Step 4 0.04 (n2 ) -
Total cost of protocol 38 (n2 ) (n2 )
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3.5.2. GKD protocol steps with contributions as depicted in Figure 4
Step 1: The L generates f(x) and C and si as aforementioned in Section 3.5.1, Step 1. Before sending C
and si , L uses the ElGamal signature algorithm in order to sign the commitment vector.
HCommit = SHA  512(C0 kC1 k C2 )
sig1 = g
r (mod p) where randomr is gcd (r ; p  1) = 1
sig2 = (HCommit   xLsig1) r 1 mod (p  1)
L encrypts the calculated si by using the receiver's public key Yi separately via the ElGamal encryption
algorithm.
Enc1Leader = g
rLeader
(mod p) where randomrLeader is2 f 1; 2; ::; p  1 g
Enc2Leader = si(Yi)
rLeader mod p
At the end of the Round 1, L sends each encrypted si to each related Ui via an open unsecure channel,
accompanied with signature pair (sig1; sig2)C of the commitment vector.
Round 2 - Reconstruction phase
Step 2: Each Uiveries the leader's signature, using the leader's public key YL:
HCommit = SHA 512 (C0 kC1 k C2 ) and gHcommit = (YL)sig1sigsig21 mod p
If this equality is satised, the receiver Ui is sure about the integrity of the C vector and legitimacy of
L . Then each Uidecrypts incoming subsecret
 
Enc1Leader; Enc
2
Leader

, using his own private key xi:
si = Enc
2
Leader  ((Enc1Leader)
xi
)
 1
mod p
Each Ui uses the receiver's public key Yj to encrypt his own si via the ElGamal encryption algorithm and sends
it to the other users of the group to satisfy secrecy and robustness against attacks.
Enc1user = g
r
mod p where random r Zp ;
Enc2user = si(Yj)
r
mod p where si is subsecret of Ui
Step 3: Each Ui decrypts the received encrypted subsecrets
 
Enc1user; Enc
2
user

from other users; si =
Enc2user((Enc
1
user)
xj
)
 1
mod p . Then these decrypted si values are veried by using C ; g
si mod p =
tQ
j=0
Ci
j
j
mod p where i = 1; : :; n are the indices of participants and j = 0; : : :; t are the indices of polynomial
coecients.
Step 4: Each party Ui has to construct polynomial f(x) from any ( t+1 ) veried subsecrets si . Then
the common secret key is established by using the Lagrange interpolation formula as explained in Step 4 of
Section 3.5.1. Here, this step does not require additional security contribution.
3.5.3. Observations and eciency analysis of GKD
Our results regarding the protocol implementations are available in Tables 3 and 4.
 The computational overhead is a quadratic value with or without security contributions.
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 Most of the computation costs of the protocol steps depend on not only the user number but also on the
threshold value t . When user number increases, the size of t will increase and the computation overhead
will become very costly. The counts of execution of encryption and decryption algorithms are n2 .
 The proposed protocol is not proper for group key establishment protocol due to very costly communication
overhead.
 Finally, round complexity is stable with only two rounds independent of user number.
 The protocol information is theoretically secure even when the adversary has unlimited computing power.
Thus, the adversary simply does not have enough information to break the encryption unless he has
( t+ 1 ) values [12,13].
4. Conclusion
Eciency is quantied in terms of computation, communication, and round complexity. The experiments in the
presented study are performed by using pairing-based cryptography with and without BLS signature scheme for
GKA and VSS with and without ElGamal encryption and signature for GKD. The related eciency analysis and
their comparisons are summarized in Table 5, and the following ndings can be useful to choose and evaluate
a group key establishment solution:
Table 5. Comparison of measured implementation results of protocol models.
Protocol models
Without contributions - Costs With contributions - Costs
Computation Communication Computation Communication
GKA ( 1 ) (n ) (n ) (n )
GKD (n2 ) (n2 ) (n2 )  (n2 )
1. The proposed contribution of signature algorithms, usage of certication mechanisms to identify the group
members, and encryption improves the reliability and robustness of the protocol and gives a chance to use
it with open unsecure networks. Hence, the protocol has some prevention of passive and active adversaries
with negligible overheads.
2. As depicted in Table 5, computational complexity is linear for GKA and quadratic for GKD, which depends
on the number of users in the group. The entity count, communication channel limits, and new participant
addition or removal scenarios are the critical parameters to decide on the most suitable protocol model of
GKE.
(a) The GKA protocol: The key issues for this model can be stated as follows:
 If any party establishes the wrong secret, he/she will be aware of the failure only when one of the
participants encrypts messages with a wrong secret key and the recipient cannot decrypt it. In that
case, the recipient sends an error message and the protocol restarts by picking a new ephemeral
secret.
 Static participant number is an important drawback of the protocol. If a new participant would like
to join a group, the protocol has to restart to regenerate a new common key. This can be accepted
as an advantage or disadvantage according to protocol expectations, because the new user never
knows the old secret key.
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(b) The GKD protocol: The key issues for this model can be stated as follows:
 Consistency of the received messages can be veried via commitments; correctness is guaranteed
this way and wrong secret sharing is impossible until the protocol is completed.
 If new party addition or removal occurs simultaneously in the same amount to/from the group during
any round of the protocol, there is no any change in the subsecrets of old parties and the common
secret s remains the same. However, if the number of entity additions and removals is not balanced,
the subsecrets of old parties and the common secret s will change since the protocol starts with new
(t; n) parameters.
3. In GKA, the communicating participants have equal contributions, but in GKD the leader is dierent
from others.
4. Certainly, there is a requirement to solve user count limits in groups for GKE protocols because every
entity in an open unsecure network should be identied to securely communicate with each other as a
closed group.
5. Furthermore, as a future study a formal security analysis of the protocol models with the proposed
contributions is necessary to truly verify the approach.
Acknowledgment
We would like to thank Asst Prof Dr Selma Tekir from the Department of Computer Engineering of _Izmir
Institute of Technology, Turkey, for all her reviewing of the draft versions of this article.
References
[1] Lin CH, Lin HH, Chang JC. Multiparty key agreement for secure teleconferencing. In: SMC 2006 Conference on
System, Man, and Cybernetics; 8{11 October 2006; Taipei, Taiwan. New York, NY, USA: IEEE. pp. 3702-3707.
[2] Yoa AC. Protocols for secure computations. In: SFCS 1982 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Sciences; 3{5 November 1982; Chicago, IL, USA. New York, NY, USA: IEEE. pp. 160-164.
[3] Feldman P. A practical scheme for non-interactive veriable secret sharing. In: SFCS 1987 28th Annual Symposium
on Foundations of Computer Science; 12{14 October 1987; Washington, DC, USA. New York, NY, USA: IEEE. pp.
427-438.
[4] Boneh D, Franklin M. Identity-based encryption from the Weil pairing. SIAM J Comput 2003; 32: 586-615.
[5] Chor B, Goldwasser S, Micali S, Awerbuch B. Veriable secret sharing and achieving simultaneity in the presence
of faults. In: SFCS 1985 26th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science; 21{23 October 1987;
Washington, DC, USA. New York, NY, USA: IEEE Computer Society. pp. 383-395.
[6] Aslanoglu R. Group key establishment protocols: pairing cryptography and veriable secret sharing scheme. MSc,
_Izmir Institute of Technology, _Izmir, Turkey, 2013.
[7] Boneh D, Lynn B, Shacham H. Short signatures from the Weil pairing. J Cryptol 2004; 4: 297-319.
[8] Barreto PSLM, Lynn B, Scott M. Ecient implementation of pairing-based cryptosystems. J Cryptol 2004; 4:
321-334.
[9] ElGamal T. A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms. IEEE T Inform Theory
1985; 31: 469-472.
56
SAH_IN and ASLANOGLU/Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci
[10] Chefranov AG, Mahmoud AY. ElGamal public key cryptosystem and signature scheme in GU(m, p, n). In: SIN 2010
3rd International Conference on Security of Information and Networks; 7{11 September 2010; Taganrog, Russian
Federation. New York, NY, USA: ACM. pp. 164-167.
[11] Wei Q, He J, Shao H. A directed signature scheme and its application to group key initial distribution. In: ICIS
2009 2nd International Conference on Interaction Sciences Information Technology, Culture and Human; 24{26
November 2009; Seoul, Korea. New York, NY, USA: ACM. pp. 265-269.
[12] Rabin T. Robust sharing of secrets when the dealer is honest or cheating. J ACM 1994; 41: 1089-1109.
[13] Badanidiyuru A, Patra A, Choudhury A, Srinathan K, Rangan CP. On the trade-o between network connectivity,
round complexity, and communication complexity of reliable message transmission. J ACM 2012; 59: 22.
57
